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Abstract—Open and large-scale systems do not encourage their
users to behave trustworthily, which may entail non-negligible
risks when interacting with unknown users, for instance when
buying an item on an e-commerce platform. Reputation mech-
anisms reduce these risks by associating a reputation score to
each user, summarizing their past behavior. To be useful to users,
reputation mechanisms need to guarantee two main properties:
the non-monotonicity of reputation scores, in order to exactly
reflect the users’ behavior, and the privacy of their users, so that
the history of their transactions is not publicly available. We
propose a distributed privacy-preserving reputation mechanism
handling non-monotonic ratings. Our proposition relies on two
distinct distributed third parties and on cryptographic tools,
including zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, anonymous proxy
signatures, and verifiable secret sharing. We show that this
proposal is computationally efficient, and thus practical. To the
best of our knowledge, this solution is the first one that preserves
users’ privacy and handles both positive and negative ratings
without relying on a central authority.
Index Terms—Reputation Mechanisms, Security, Privacy, Dis-
tributed Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Reputation mechanisms have come out as an effective tool
to encourage trust and cooperation in electronic environments,
e.g. e-commerce applications or web-based communities. A
reputation mechanism enables users to rate services or people
based on their experience [18]. These ratings or feedback are
aggregated to derive reputation scores. Scores are publicly
available, which allows any user to evaluate the trustworthiness
of target entities (the ratees). Thus, reputation mechanisms
identify capable entities and discourage others from behaving
incorrectly [12]. Some reputation mechanisms require a central
authority to correctly process ratings and compute reputation
scores, while others rely on distributed components. The for-
mer design introduces a single point of vulnerability, allowing
a single entity to fully control all reputation scores. As will
be shown in the following, our reputation mechanism meets
security and trust exigences through distributed computations.
While aggregating ratings is necessary to derive reputation
scores, identifiers and ratings are personal data, whose collect
and use may fall under legislation [14]. Furthermore, as shown
by recent works [27], solely relying on pseudonyms to interact
is not sufficient to guarantee user privacy [32]. This has given
rise to the proposition of a series of reputation mechanisms
which address either the non-exposure of the history of
raters [7], the non-disclosure of individual feedback [19], [24],
[29], the secrecy of ratings and the k-anonymity of ratees [11],
or the anonymity and unlinkability of both raters and ratees [4],
[7].
Regrettably, the search for privacy has led to restrictions
in the computation of the reputation score: clients cannot
issue negative ratings anymore [4], [7]. This restriction comes
from the management of ratings. In existing privacy-preserving
mechanisms, the ratees have the opportunity to skip some
of the received ratings to increase their privacy. This is not
conceivable in a non-monotonic reputation mechanism: ratees
could skip negative ratings to increase their reputation scores.
This is a problem because a ratee that received a thousand
positive ratings and no negative ratings is indistinguishable
from a ratee that received a thousand positive ratings and a
thousand negative ratings. This clearly does not encourage
ratees to behave correctly. Furthermore, Baumeister et al.
explain that “bad feedback has stronger effects than good
feedback” on our opinions [6]. Negative ratings are thus
essential to reputation mechanisms. So far, preserving the
privacy of both raters and ratees and handling both positive and
negative ratings has been recognized as a complex challenge.
Quoting Bethencourt et al., “Most importantly, how can we
support non-monotonic reputation systems, which can express
and enforce bad reputation as well as good? Answering
this question will require innovative definitions as well as
cryptographic constructions” [7].
The design of privacy-preserving non-monotonic reputation
mechanisms is highly desirable in many applications, where
both quality of service and privacy are very important. This
is particularly true in all audit processes, and web-based
community applications. As an example, let us focus on an
application concerning all of us, the scientific peer review
process.
This process is at the core of many scientific committees,
including those of conferences, journals, and grant applica-
tions. Its goal is to assess the quality of research through
experts, the peer reviewers, that evaluate manuscripts and
proposals based on their scientific quality, significance, and
originality. Peer reviewing is an activity that requires to spend
considerable effort and time for doing legitimate, rigorous and
ethical reviews. Reviewers are chosen by committee members
among all their colleagues and peers. In order to remove
any bias, several reviewers are assigned to each manuscript,
and the reviews are double-blind. The increasing number of
solicitations makes the reviewing task even more challenging
and, by force of circumstances, may lower the quality of
reviews.
Imagine now a privacy-preserving reputation mechanism
whose goal would be to assess reviews according to their
helpfulness and fairness. Authors would anonymously rate
each received review according to both criteria. Journal editors
or committee chairs would collect these ratings to update the
reputation score of the concerned reviewers. Those reputations
would be maintained in a very large shared anonymous repos-
itory organized according to the thematic of the anonymized
reviewers. Editors and chairs would then have the opportunity
to choose anonymous reviewers from this repository according
to their reputation to build their reviewing committee. The
rationale of such a repository is three-fold. Authors would have
an incentive to honestly and carefully rate each received review
as their goal would be to contribute to the creation of a pool
of helpful and fair reviewers. Committee chairs would take
advantage of using such a repository as they could decrease
the load imposed to each selected reviewer by soliciting a
very large number of them. Consequently, each reviewer could
devote more time to their few reviews, and would thus provide
highly helpful reviews, increasing accordingly the quality of
published articles or granted applications. Finally, it would
be at reviewers’ advantage to provide helpful reviews to have
a high reputation, which would be a unanimous acknowledg-
ment of their expertise. As a consequence, such an anonymous
repository would increase the quality of accepted manuscripts
and proposals in a fully privacy-preserving way.
In the remaining of the paper, we present the design and
evaluation of a non-monotonic distributed reputation mech-
anism preserving the privacy of both parties. After having
presented the state of art in Section II, we motivate and present
the properties that should be met by a reputation mechanism to
be secure, to respect the privacy of all its parties, and to handle
non-monotonic ratings in Section III. Section IV then provides
a description of the main principles of our approach to build
such a mechanism. As detailed in Section V, it relies on two
distinct distributed third-parties and cryptographic tools. The
orchestration of these tools is presented in Section VI. We
finally show in Section VII that this unprecedented mechanism
is computationally efficient, and thus implementable in large-
scale applications. Section VIII concludes.
II. STATE OF THE ART
One of the first examples of reputation mechanisms has
been set up by eBay. In this mechanism, clients and service
providers rate each other after each transaction: ratings are
either +1, 0, or −1 according to the (dis)satisfaction of users.
The reputation score of a user is simply the sum of the
received ratings. Resnick and Zeckhauser have analyzed this
mechanism and the effects of reputation on eBay [31], and
have highlighted a strong bias toward positive ratings. More
elaborated reputations mechanisms have been proposed, such
as the Beta Reputation System [21], methods based on the
Dempster-Shafer theory of belief [34], or using Distributed
Hash Tables to collect ratings or manage reputation scores [3],
[20], [23]. Jøsang et al. propose a broad survey of reputation
mechanisms and reputation score functions [22], while Marti
and Garcia-Molina focus on their implementation in P2P
systems [26]. Indubitably, the nature of ratings and the com-
putation of reputation scores have been thoroughly researched.
In this work, we do not make any assumptions regarding the
function that computes reputation scores. Indeed, our solution
handles both positive and negative ratings, and may thus use
any computation function.
One of the first known reputation mechanism taking the
privacy of users into account has been proposed by Pavlov et
al. [29]. Their solution presents a series of distributed algo-
rithms for computing the reputation score of service providers
without divulging the ratings issued by clients. Their solution
has been improved by Hasan et al. [19], [20] for different
adversary models, and stronger privacy guarantees. Similarly,
Kerschbaum proposes a centralized mechanism computing the
reputation scores of service providers, without disclosing the
individual ratings of the clients [24].
The secrecy of ratings contributes to the privacy of users,
but is clearly insufficient: service providers can still discrimi-
nate their clients according to their identity or to additional
information unrelated to the transaction. As we previously
mentioned, identifiers and ratings are data that can be con-
sidered personal. Specifically, as pointed out by Mahler and
Olsen [25], the European Directive 95/46/EC on data protec-
tion states that “the data [must not] be excessive in relation
to the purposes for which they are processed” [14]. A priori,
the identity of users have no relation to their behavior. Thus,
identities have no added utility for reputation mechanisms and
are not necessary. Steinbrecher argues that reputation mecha-
nisms must guarantee both the anonymity of their users, and
the unlinkability of their transactions to be fully adopted [32].
Both properties have been lately formalized by Pfitzmann and
Hansen [30]. Namely, a user is anonymous if this user is not
identifiable within a set of users, called the anonymity set. The
transactions of a user are unlinkable if the participants in two
different transactions cannot be distinguished.
Hence, Clauß et al. [11] propose a centralized mecha-
nism guaranteeing both the secrecy of ratings and the k-
anonymity of service providers. However, this mechanism
does not preserve the privacy of clients. Androulaki et al. [4]
propose a centralized reputation mechanism guaranteeing both
the anonymity and unlinkability of both parties. However,
since providers send a request to the central bank for their
ratings to be taken into account, only positive ratings are
handled. In addition, this mechanism is vulnerable to ballot-
stuffing attacks [12], that is, a single client can issue many
ratings on a provider to bias her reputation. Hence, a provider
with thousands of positive ratings from a single client is
indistinguishable from a provider with positive ratings from
thousands of different users, which is problematic.
Whitby et al. [33] propose a technique mitigating ballot-
stuffing attacks, however, such a technique requires the ability
to link the ratings concerning the same provider. Bethencourt
et al. [7] propose to compute such a link. That is, they propose
a mechanism linking all the transactions that have occurred
with the same partners (client and service provider), while
preserving their privacy. However, their reputation mechanism
requires high computational power, bandwidth and storage
capacity. For instance, when proving their reputation score,
providers must send about 500 kB per received rating, which is
from a practical point of view unbearable. Furthermore, clients
cannot issue negative ratings.
We are not aware of any reputation mechanism preserving
the privacy of its users and allowing clients to issue negative
ratings. So far, achieving both at the same time has been
recognized as a complex challenge. This is the objective of
this paper.
III. MODEL AND PROPERTIES
A. Terminology
In the following, we differentiate transactions from in-
teractions. More precisely, a transaction corresponds to the
exchange of a service between a client and a service provider.
An interaction corresponds to the whole protocol followed
by the client and the provider, during which the clients gets
the provider’s reputation and the client issues a rating on the
provider. Note that we make no assumption about the nature
of transactions: they can be reviews, web-based community
applications, or the purchase and delivery of physical goods.
Once a transaction is over, the client is expected to issue
a rating representative of the provider’s behavior during the
transaction. Nevertheless, clients can omit to issue such a
rating, deliberately or not. While dissatisfied clients almost
always issue a rating, this is not the case of satisfied clients.
To cope with this asymmetry, we introduce the notion of proofs
of transaction: a proof of transaction is a token delivered to
providers for transactions when the client did not issue a rating.
Such proofs of transaction allow clients to distinguish between
multiple providers that have the same reputation. We denote
by report the proof of transaction associated with the client’s
rating, if any. These reports serve as the basis to compute
reputation scores.
Finally, we say that a user is honest if this user follows the
protocol of the reputation mechanism. Otherwise, this user is
malicious. Finally, a report or a reputation score is valid if an
honest user accepts it. A more rigorous definition is given in
Section VI.
B. Model of the System
We consider an open system populated by a large number of
users, who can be malicious. Before entering the system, users
register to a central authority C, that gives them identifiers and
certificates. Once registered, users do not need to interact with
C anymore. A user can act as a client, as a service provider,
or as both, and obtains credentials for both roles. We assume
that users communicate over an anonymous communication
network, e.g. Tor [13], to prevent the tracking of their IP
addresses.
C. Properties of Reputation Mechanisms
Our reputation mechanism aims at offering three main
guarantees to users. First and foremost, the privacy of users
must be preserved. Second, the issuing of reports must take
place without any problems. Finally, every data needed for
the computation of reputation scores must be available and
unfalsifiable. Note that we only give intuitive views of the
properties; we defer their formal statements and their proofs
in Appendix B.
Privacy properties are detailed by Property 1 and 2. Prop-
erty 1 stipulates that clients do not know the service providers
they interacted with when they rate them. Property 2 claims
that any two clients have to remain indistinguishable. Proper-
ties 3 and 4 are related to the undeniability of reports. These
properties expect that providers obtain proofs of transaction,
and that clients are able to issue ratings. Property 5 tackles
with the unforgeability of reports. Finally, Properties 6 and 7
respectively stipulate that computation of the reputation scores
cannot be biased by ballot-stuffing attacks, and that reputation
scores are unforgeable.
Property 1: Privacy of service providers. When a client rates
an honest service provider, this service provider is anonymous
among all honest service providers with an equivalent reputa-
tion.
Property 2: Privacy of clients. When a service provider
conducts a transaction with an honest client, this client is
anonymous among all honest clients. Furthermore, the inter-
actions of honest clients with different service providers are
unlinkable.
Property 3: Undeniability of ratings. At the end of a
transaction between a client and a service provider, the client
can issue a valid rating, which will be taken into account in
the reputation score of the provider.
Property 4: Undeniability of proofs of transaction. At the
end of a transaction between a client and a service provider,
the provider can obtain a valid proof of transaction.
Property 5: Unforgeability of reports. Let r be a report
involving a client and a service provider. If r is valid and
either the client or the provider is honest, then r was issued
at the end of an interaction between both users.
Property 6: Linkability of reports. Two valid reports emitted
by the same client on the same service provider are publicly
linkable.
Property 7: Unforgeability of reputation scores. A service
provider cannot forge a valid reputation score different from
the one computed from all her reports.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF THE SOLUTION
A. Distributed Trusted Third-Parties
We explained in Section I that service providers must not
manage themselves their reputation score to guarantee their
reliability. To solve this issue, we propose to construct a dis-
tributed trusted authority in charge of updating and certifying
reputation scores. We call accredited signers the entities con-
stituting this authority. This first distributed authority has two
main features. Firstly, this authority must involve fairly trusted
entities or enough entities to guarantee that the malicious
behavior of some of them never compromises the computation
of reputation scores. Secondly, this authority must ensure that
providers remain indistinguishable from each others.
Moreover, to ensure the undeniability of ratings (Prop-
erty 3), a client must be able to issue his report, even if the
service provider does not complete the interaction. However,
the precautions taken for that purpose must not imply sending
identifying data before the transaction. In the same way, data
identifying the client must not be sent before the transaction to
ensure the undeniability of proof of transactions (Property 4).
To solve this issue, we propose a distributed trusted au-
thority in charge of guaranteeing that reports can be built.
This distributed authority must collect information before
the transaction, and potentially help one of the two parties
afterwards: it must thus be online. We call share carriers the
entities constituting this authority.
Both distributed authorities could be gathered in a single
one. The drawback of this approach is that this distributed
trusted authority should be simultaneously online, unique, and
fairly trusted or reasonably large. The uniqueness and the
participation in each interaction would induce an excessive
load on each entity of this distributed authority. We thus
suggest distinct authorities, for efficiency reasons. Accredited
signers are then a unique set of fairly trusted or numerous
entities, periodically updating the reputation scores of all
providers. On the other hand, share carriers are chosen dy-
namically during each interaction among all service providers.
Accredited signers manage every reputation score, and are thus
critical in our mechanism. On the other side, share carriers are
responsible for the issuing of a single report. Hence, they do
not need to be as trustworthy as the accredited signers.
To deal with the privacy of both clients and providers,
share carriers use verifiable secret sharing [15]. This basically
consists in disseminating shares of a secret to the share
carriers, so that they cannot individually recover the secret,
but allow the collaborative reconstruction of this secret.
B. Sketch of the Protocol
The ultimate goal of our solution is to provide clients with
an access to a shared repository, in which a list of services are
recorded together with the reputation scores of the anonymous
providers that supply those services. Clients can select services
based on the displayed reputation score, which automatically
sends an anonymous invitation to the associated providers.
The service provider replies by sending her pseudonym, and
proofs that both the pseudonym and the displayed reputation
are valid. Since providers and clients must not reveal any
personal information, they both use zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge [17] to prove the validity of their pseudonyms. Note
that both clients and providers compute their own pseudonyms,
which they are free to renew at each interaction. Providers
and clients also need to sign their messages to guarantee
their integrity, without revealing their identity. They thus use
anonymous proxy signatures [1]. Meanwhile, they agree on
the set of share carriers they will rely on.
The next step of the protocol guarantees the undeniability
of ratings and proofs of transaction. As aforementioned, a
provider uses verifiable secret sharing to split her identifier
among all share carriers. Thanks to the zero-knowledge proof
system, the provider is also able to prove that the secret was
correctly shared. Similarly, the client uses verifiable secret
sharing and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge to guarantee
that the provider will obtain a proof of transaction. Once this
step is over, both parties engage in their transaction.
At the end of the transaction, both parties issue their report
through an interactive process. As will be detailed in the
following, a report contains the rating of the client as well
as the identifier of the provider. Note that the presence of
the provider identifier does not violate Property 1 since the
rating of the client is signed before the service provider reveals
her identifier. If the client does not want to rate the service,
then the provider obtains a proof of transaction from the share
carriers. On the other hand, if the provider does not want to
help in the construction of the report, then the client signs the
rating and obtains the identifier of the provider from the share
carriers.
Periodically, the accredited signers gather all the issued
reports, and verify them. They then update and sign the
reputation scores of all service providers. Thanks to these
signatures, service providers will be able to prove their updated
reputation score during their subsequent interactions. More
details are given in Sections V and VI.
V. BUILDING BLOCKS
This section describes the tools used during interactions to
guarantee both privacy and security of the users.
A. Building Trust
1) Share Carriers: As previously explained, at the be-
ginning of the interaction, both the client and the provider
randomly choose sufficiently many users to constitute the
share carriers. Specifically, both parties independently draw
their own nonces, i.e. random numbers, and combine them
to deterministically select the share carriers. The independent
choice of the nonces guarantees that neither the client nor
the service provider are able to choose the share carriers
by themselves. Let seed be the combination of the drawn
nonces, {0, 1, . . . , N−1} be the set of potential share carriers
(i.e. the set of service providers), and nSC be the number of
share carriers to be selected. The function ChooseSC(seed, N)
returns a set of nSC share carriers randomly chosen in the
system. We have
ChooseSC(seed, N) ={⌊
H(01 ‖ seed ‖ i)×
N
2h
⌋
, i ∈ {0, . . . , n′ − 1}
}
,
where H is a hash function, e.g. SHA-256 [28], with h-bits
output and n′ is chosen so that the resulting set contains nSC
different share carriers. The idea behind this function is to
divide the set {0, 1, . . . , 2h − 1} into N intervals of similar
sizes, and to compute a sequence of pseudo-random elements
in {0, 1, . . . , 2h − 1} from the seed. Each element points out
an interval, and the first nSC different intervals corresponding
to the first elements in the sequence are selected. We obtain
the nSC corresponding share carriers. Appendix A discusses
the number of share carriers that must be chosen to prevent
collusions.
2) Accredited Signers: Accredited signers are users chosen
in the system. There are no restrictive requisites for the
selection of these users within the system, but choosing them
among reasonably available users will have less impact on
the latency of the reputation score updates. For instance,
the central authority C (see Section III-B) can be in charge
of choosing the accredited signers. These accredited signers
obtain from C a delegation for the verification of reports,
and the signature of reputation scores. In the following, nAS
represents the number of accredited signers. We assume that
at least a majority of the accredited signers are honest.
As previously described, the aggregation of the reports and
the computation of reputation scores is done off-line, without
any direct impact on the interactions. Therefore, the accredited
signers do not sign reputation scores after each interaction.
Rather, they sign scores at fixed intervals of time, that we call
rounds in the following. Both the duration and start time of
each round are public parameters. A reasonable trade-off is to
sign reports every day. To prove their reputation score, service
providers use signatures on the current round from a majority
of the accredited signers, i.e. at least tAS = (nAS + 1)/2
signatures.
B. Cryptographic Tools
We now present the cryptographic tools used by our reputa-
tion protocol, that is, the invariant to prevent ballot stuffing; the
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system; an anonymous
proxy signature scheme that preserves the privacy of users;
finally, a verifiable secret sharing scheme that guarantees the
undeniability of reports.
1) Setting: The underlying structure for our cryptographic
tools is a bilinear group Λ = (p, G1, G2, GT , e, G1, G2)
in which G1,G2,GT are three groups of prime order p that
we write multiplicatively. The map e : G1×G2 → GT is
non-degenerate and bilinear. G1 ∈ G1 (and resp. G2 ∈ G2)
is a group generator of G1 (resp. G2). The security of the
presented tools relies on the intractability of the Symmetric
eXternal Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption in Λ, and on a
specific assumption along the same lines as the Strong Diffie
Hellman (SDH) assumption [1]. In the following, if X is a
tuple then Xk represents the k-th term of X .
2) Invariant: As detailed in Section II, reputation mecha-
nisms are potential targets of ballot-stuffing attacks, in which
a single client rates a service provider multiple times, in order
to heavily bias the reputation of the provider. We protect
our system against such attacks by strongly linking each
interaction through an invariant jointly computed by both
interacting parties. Note that Bethencourt et al. proposed a
similar approach, though more complex [7]. We build the
invariant as follows. It is derived from the identifiers of both
parties, namely IdSP ∈ G1 for the service provider, and
idCl ∈ Zp for the client. We define the invariant as
Inv(IdSP, idCl) = (IdSP)
idCl .
To preserve the privacy of both interacting parties, the invariant
cannot be directly computed before the transaction. Indeed, in
order to compute it directly, a user must know the identifiers
of both the provider and the client. Thus, we propose to
compute the invariant in three steps, which require a fixed
group element Y1 ∈ G1 randomly generated. First, the service
provider computes a pre-invariant by masking her identifier
IdSP with randomness r ∈ Zp (G1 and Y1 are public elements).
We have
pre_inv = Pre_inv(IdSP, r) = (G1
r, IdSP ·Y1
r).
Then, the client injects his identifier idCl ∈ Zp and randomness
s ∈ Zp in the previous result to compute a masked invariant
defined as
masked_inv = Mask(pre_inv, idCl, s)
= (G1
s · Y1
idCl , pre_inv
1
s · pre_inv
2
idCl)
=
(
G1
s · Y1
idCl , IdSP
idCl · (G1
s · Y1
idCl)r
)
.
Finally, the provider obtains the invariant from masked_inv by
computing
Unmask(masked_inv, r) = masked_inv2 ·masked_inv1
−r
= (IdSP)
idCl = Inv(IdSP, idCl).
3) SXDH Commitments: SXDH commitments [17] in a
multiplicative group G1 (resp. G2) generated by G1 (resp. G2)
permit to commit to values X in this group without revealing
them. Note that it is also possible to commit to scalarsm ∈ Zp,
by taking X = G1
m.
Committing to X ∈ G1 requires a commitment key (a tuple
of group elements), and two random elements r, r′ ∈ Zp. The
commitment is denoted by CX = Com
(
X, (r, r′)
)
. Opening
a commitment C requires an opening key, that is a scalar α
associated to the commitment key. The opening is denoted by
X = Open(CX , α).
In the remainder of the paper, whenever we write that x is
the value committed in Cx, we mean that Cx is a commitment
to x. For simplicity reasons, we use Com to denote the
commitment to an element which may be in G1, G2 or Zp.
Furthermore, when randomnesses used in a commitment are
not essential, we simply write Com(X, _).
4) Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs: To prove their
possession of secret values satisfying given statements without
revealing them, both clients and service providers use the proof
system proposed by Groth and Sahai [17]. This system allows
users to compute Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proofs of
knowledge (NIZK) on four kinds of statements, including
pairing product equations(
n∏
i=1
e(Ai, Yi)
) m∏
j=1
e(Xj , Bj)
 n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
e(Xj , Yi)
γij
 = RT ,
and multi-scalar multiplication equations in G1(
n∏
i=1
Ai
yi
) m∏
j=1
Xj
bj
 n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
Xj
γij yi
 = R1,
where capital letters denote group elements and lower-case
letters denote scalars, i.e. elements of Zp. In these equations,
Ai, Bj , bj , γij , RT , and R1 are public elements, while Xj ,
Yi, and yi are secret values.
The proofs are based on SXDH commitments to the secret
values. From the randomnesses used in the commitments,
a prover computes specific group elements (the proof). The
verifier can check the validity of the equation using the proof
and the committed secrets, without any access to the secrets.
A prover can moreover combine multiple statements to prove
that secret values simultaneously satisfy different equations.
According to the notations introduced by Camenish et al. [10],
we denote a proof of knowledge of secret values (x1, . . . , xk)
following equations (E1, . . . , Eℓ) by NIZK{x1, . . . , xk : E1∧
· · · ∧ Eℓ}.
5) Anonymous Proxy Signatures: Throughout their interac-
tion, both parties must sign messages. However, verifying a
signature requires to have access to the verification key of
the signer, which is incompatible with the privacy properties
since verification keys identify signers. An anonymous proxy
signature scheme [16] allows receivers to check the validity
of signed messages without having access to the identity of
the signer. The only obtained information is that the signer
received a delegation from an identified authority. To achieve
such a property, a signer uses NIZKs to hide all elements
related to their identity in the signature. An efficient anony-
mous proxy signature scheme can be obtained by combining
the structure-preserving signature scheme proposed by Abe et
al. [1] and the proof system proposed by Groth and Sahai [17].
Let (vkU , skU ) be the verification and signing key of user U .
Then, the signature of message m is σ = Sign(m, skU ). The
verification consists in the computation of Verify(σ,m, vkU ):
the result is True iff signature σ is valid for the pair (m, vkU ).
We now consider a signing key skC and the corresponding
verification key vkC of a certification authority C. A certificate
for user U is certU = Sign(vkU , skC). Such a certificate is valid
if and only if Verify(certU , vkU , vkC) = True.
Using the structure-preserving property of the signature
scheme, an anonymous proxy signature of messagem, from an
anonymous signer U certified by the authority C, contains the
SXDH commitments to certU , vkU and σ, and a Groth-Sahai
proof,
NIZK
{
certU , vkU , σ :
(
Verify(certU , vkU , vkC) = True
)
∧
(
Verify(σ,m, vkU ) = True
)}
.
In our context, both clients and service providers compute
anonymous proxy signatures to authenticate messages without
disclosing their identity. More precisely, they first send com-
mitments to their public key vkU and their certificate certU
together with the proof of registration ΠcertU given by
ΠcertU = NIZK
{
certU , vkU :(
Verify(certU , vkU , vkC) = True
)}
.
For each message m to be signed, both clients and providers
compute a signature σ, and send a commitment to this signa-
ture, and a proof of validity Πσ , that is
Πσ = NIZK
{
vkU , σ :
(
Verify(σ,m, vkU ) = True
)}
.
The use of the same commitment to vkU is of primary
interest here, as the verifier has to check only one proof
of registration. Moreover, this commitment establishes a link
between the anonymous proxy signatures sent during an in-
teraction: the signer is the same. For convenience reasons, we
denote by APSign(m, skU ) the proof Πσ with the commitment
to the signature of m.
6) Verifiable Secret Sharing: Verifiable secret sharing [15]
is a threshold cryptographic scheme allowing to split a secret
into n different shares. As in a secret sharing scheme, the
secret can be recomputed from a predefined number t of shares
(with t 6 n), while giving no information to whoever knows
strictly less than t shares. The extra-property consists in the
proven consistency of distributed shares: the prover guarantees
that the expected secret was shared, and that any set of t shares
allows the computation of this unique secret. We now present
a verifiable secret sharing scheme for group elements, using
both SXDH commitments and NIZKs.
LetX ∈ G1 be the secret of the prover, on which this prover
has certificate certX such that Verify(certX , X, vkC) = True.
To share X , the prover chooses a t − 1 degree polynomial
Q : z ∈ Zp 7→ (X ·
∏t−1
j=1(Aj)
zj ) ∈ G1, in which the (Aj) are
randomly chosen in G1. The shares are (i, Qi = Q(i))16i6n.
Lagrange interpolation with t distinct shares (i1, Qi1), . . . ,
(it, Qit) allows the reconstruction of secret X = Q(0), as
follows
X = Interp
(
(ij , Qij )16j6t
)
=
t∏
j=1
Qij
(∏
k 6=j(ik/(ik−ij))
)
.
To prove the consistency of the shares, the prover shows
that the same polynomial Q is used for the computation of
all shares. Thus, the prover commits to the secret X and to
the coefficients (Aj), that is, CX = Com(X, _) and CAj =
Com(Aj , _) for 1 6 j < t. The prover then computes NIZKs
assessing both the consistency of the shares, i.e. a proof ΠQi
that Qi = Q(i), and the correctness of the secret, using a proof
of correctness ΠX including a commitment to the certificate
(see details in Section VI). Afterwards, the prover sends i, Qi,
CX , (CAj ), and ΠQi to each share carrier, and CX , (CAj ),
CcertX and ΠX to the verifier. Each share carrier verifies ΠQi
and sends a confirmation to the verifier, that is i, CX , and
(CAj ). If the commitments received from the share carriers
and from the prover are the same, then the consistency of
the shares is proven. In the meantime, the verifier checks the
validity of ΠX .
The verifiable secret sharing is useful iff (i) the verifier will
eventually receive enough valid signatures, (ii) the malicious
share carriers cannot recover the secret, and (iii) the honest
share carriers can recover the secret. By noting b the number
of malicious share carriers and ℓ the number of responses that
the verifier is waiting for, these conditions translate to b < t,
ℓ 6 n− b, and t 6 ℓ− b. An optimal choice for t is
t = ⌈n/3⌉ and ℓ = 2t− 1,
which tolerates up to b = t− 1 malicious share carriers.
Remark 1: Such a sharing can be made offline, that is
without any interaction with the share carriers before the
reconstruction of the secret. In this case, the prover encrypts
the shares with the keys of the share carriers to prevent
the verifier from reconstructing the secret. To guarantee the
correctness of the shares, the prover computes NIZK proofs
of their encryption and of their reconstruction. To prevent
the verifier from asking the decryption of arbitrary encrypted
shares, the prover also signs each share, and computes a NIZK
proving the validity of each signature, while masking the share,
the signature, and the verification key.
VI. REPUTATION PROTOCOL
A. System Setup
Throughout the reputation protocol, users need the crypto-
graphic keys and identifiers presented in Table I. Specifically,
the central authority C uses a structure-preserving signature
key pair (vkC , skC) to generate certificates on users’ creden-
tials. To enter the system, users register to this authority, which
may require a computational or monetary cost [9] to mitigate
Sybil attacks. Note that the central authority is required only
for the registration of users, and possibly for the choice of
accredited signers (see Section V-A2).
Clients have a structure-preserving signature key pair, con-
sisting of a verification key vkCl and a signing key skCl. When
clients enter the system, they register to the central authority
C to get a random identifier idCl ∈ Zp, and a certificate certCl
on idCl and vkCl. Similarly, service providers have a structure-
preserving signature key pair (vkSP, skSP), and register to C to
obtain a random identifier IdSP ∈ G1, and a certificate certSP
on IdSP and vkSP.
Accredited signers have a structure-preserving signature key
pair (vkAS, skAS) and a classical certificate certAS on vkAS.
They use these keys to sign the reputation score of service
providers. We denote by σi the signature of the i-th accredited
signer on the reputation score repSP of the provider, for current
round rnd (see Section V-A):
σi = Sign
(
〈vkSP, repSP, rnd〉, skASi
)
.
Share carriers possess two key pairs, namely a classical
encryption key pair (ekSC, dkSC), and a classical signature key
pair (skSC, vkSC), each of them used to protect their commu-
nications (encryption of received messages, and signature of
sent messages). They also have a certificate certSC on ekSC
and vkSC, issued by the central authority C.
Both clients and providers compute by themselves their own
pseudonyms. They renew them at each interaction. Pseudo-
nyms are SXDH commitments to their verification keys. Simi-
larly, both clients and service providers compute commitments
CidCl and CIdSP to their identifiers idCl and IdSP, leading to{
nymCl = Com(vkCl, _)
CidCl = Com(idCl, _),
{
nymSP = Com
(
vkSP, (rSP, r
′
SP)
)
CIdSP = Com(IdSP, (rIdSP , r
′
IdSP
)).
Clients compute commitments CcertCl to their certificate, and
NIZK proofs of their validity ΠcertCl (see Section V-B5).
Similarly, service providers compute commitments CcertSP
and proofs ΠcertCl . Finally, service providers compute a pre-
invariant pre_inv from IdSP and a randomly chosen scalar
rpre_inv: pre_inv = Pre_inv(IdSP, rpre_inv) (see Section V-B2).
B. Proof of the Reputation Score
When a client wishes to interact with a service provider,
he sends a pseudonym nymCl and a proof of its validity
CidCl , CcertCl , and ΠcertCl to the provider (see Figure 1).
Once the provider has verified this proof, she sends back her
pseudonym, reputation, pre-invariant and respective proofs of
validity. That is, she sends nymSP, CIdSP , CcertSP , ΠcertSP ,
repSP, a proof of reputation Πrep, pre_inv, and a proof Πpre_inv
of its computation. These proofs are defined by
Πrep =NIZK
{
vkSP, σi1 , . . . , σitAS :
∧tASj=1
(
Verify(σij , 〈vkSP, repSP, rnd〉, vkASij )
)}
,
Πpre_inv =NIZK
{
IdSP, rpre_inv :
pre_inv = Pre_inv(IdSP, rpre_inv)
}
.
Table I
USERS’ CREDENTIALS (BOLD KEYS ARE SECRET)
Client Provider SC AS
Element Commitment Element Commitment
Signature key skCl skSP skSC skAS
Verification key vkCl nymCl vkSP nymSP vkSC vkAS
Decryption key dkSC
Encryption key ekSC
Invariant idCl CidCl IdSP CIdSP
Certificate certCl CcertCl certSP CcertSP certSC certAS
(verified with) (vkCl, idCl) (ΠcertCl , nymCl, CidCl ) (vkSP, IdSP) (ΠcertSP , nymSP, CIdSP )
Reputation repSP
Cert. of reputation {σ1, . . . , σtAS} ΠrepSP
(verified with) (vkSP, repSP) (nymSP, repSP)
Client SP
nymCl, CidCl , CcertCl ,ΠcertCl
nymSP, CIdSP , CcertSP ,ΠcertSP , repSP,Πrep,
pre_inv,Πpre_inv, CSC
rSC, σCl
sSC, σSP
Figure 1. Proof of the reputation score
In the meantime, the provider chooses a nonce sSC and
commits to it by sending CSC = H(00‖sSC).
1 If the reputa-
tion of the provider suits the client, and if all the proofs are
valid, the client computes the masked invariant masked_inv =
Mask(pre_inv, idCl, rmasked_inv), chooses a nonce rSC, signs a
hash of (CSC, rSC, nymSP), and sends rSC and the signature
σCl to the provider with
σCl = APSign
(
H(CSC, rSC, nymSP), skCl
)
.
If σCl is valid, the provider signs a hash of (sSC, rSC, nymCl),
and sends sSC and the signature σSP to the client with
σSP = APSign
(
H(sSC, rSC, nymCl), skSP
)
.
Note that the signatures guarantee that the client agreed to
conduct a transaction with provider nymSP, who uses the
randomness hidden in CSC, and that the provider agreed to
conduct a transaction with client nymCl, who uses random-
ness rSC. Once the client and the provider have exchanged
their nonces, they choose the share carriers as described in
Section V-A1, using (sSC‖rSC‖ nymCl ‖ nymSP) as a seed.
In the remainder, this element serves as an identifier of the
transaction, and we note it idtrans.
C. Sharing Ingredients of the Report
Once both the client and the service provider have agreed
to engage in the transaction, they rely on the verifiable
secret sharing scheme described in Section V-B6 to guarantee
1This concatenation guarantees that sSC and rSC are chosen independently.
the undeniability properties. The service provider shares her
identifier IdSP, that is, she chooses a polynomial Q of degree
tSC−1, with coefficients IdSP, A1, . . . , AtSC−1, where the Aj
are randomly chosen in G1. The shares are the
(
i, Qi = Q(i)
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nSC. To prove the sharing, the provider computes
commitments CAj to the Aj , and NIZK proofs ΠQi defined
by
ΠQi = NIZK
{
IdSP, (Aj)j : Qi = IdSP
tSC−1∏
j=1
Aj
(ij)
}
,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nSC. Note that nymSP, CIdSP , CcertSP and ΠcertSP
have already proven the correctness of the secret. Finally,
the provider sends the (CAj ) to the client, and encrypts and
sends idtrans, (i, Qi), CIdSP , (CAj )1≤j<tSC , and ΠQi to the i-th
share-carrier. If the received proof is valid, the share carriers
send a confirmation to the client, that is idtrans, i, CIdSP ,
and (CAj ), together with a signature. If these commitments
are the same as the one received from the provider, the
client accepts this confirmation. Once the client has received
ℓ = 2⌈nSC/3⌉− 1 valid shares, he accepts the sharing (as the
validity of the shares guarantees the undeniability properties).
Figure 2 describes this exchange.
SP SCi Client
idtrans, (i, Qi), CIdSP ,
(CAj )j ,ΠQi
idtrans, i, CIdSP , (CAj )j
(CAj )j
Figure 2. Secretly Sharing the Provider’s Identifier
In the meantime, the client shares his secret, that is the
masked invariant masked_inv. Since masked_inv consists of
two elements, he must double the sharing. That is, the client
chooses two polynomial R1, R2 of degree tSC − 1 with
coefficients masked_invk, B1,k, . . . , BtSC−1,k for k ∈ {1,2},
and the shares are
(
i, Ri =
(
R1(i), R2(i)
))
for 1 ≤ i ≤
nSC. To prove the sharing, the client computes commitments
Cmasked_inv and CBj,k to masked_inv and to the Bj,k, and
NIZK proofs ΠRi defined by
ΠRi =NIZK
{
masked_inv, (Bj,k) :
Ri,k = masked_invk ·
tSC−1∏
j=1
Bj,k
(ij),k ∈ {1,2}
}
,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ nSC. To prove the correctness of the secret, the
client also computes a proof ΠCmasked_inv defined by
ΠCmasked_inv =NIZK
{
idCl,masked_inv, rmasked_inv :
masked_inv = Mask(pre_inv, idCl, rmasked_inv)
}
.
Thus, the client sends Cmasked_inv, (CBj,k), and ΠCmasked_inv
to the provider, and encrypts and sends idtrans, (i, Ri),
Cmasked_inv, (CBj,k), and ΠRi to the i-th share carrier. As
previously, the i-th share carrier sends a confirmation con-
sisting of idtrans, i, Cmasked_inv, (CBj,k), and a signature to
the provider if the share is valid. The provider accepts such a
confirmation if the commitments are identical to the ones she
received, and accepts the sharing as soon as she has received
ℓ valid confirmations. Figure 3 describes this exchange. Once
both sharings have been accepted, both parties can conduct
their transaction.
Client SCi SP
idtrans, (i, Ri), Cmasked_inv,
(CBj,k)j,k,ΠRi
idtrans, i, Cmasked_inv
k
, (CBj,k)j,k
Cmasked_inv, (CBj,k)j,k,
ΠCmasked_inv
Figure 3. Secretly Sharing the Masked Invariant
D. Issuing Reports
Once the transaction is over, the client can issue a rating
and the provider can obtain a proof of transaction. Scenario
A describes their interactions.
a) Scenario A – Standard case.: The client chooses a
rating ρ and computes both a signature σρ,Cl to prevent any
modification on ρ, and a proof Πmasked_inv of masked_inv
computation. We have
σρ,Cl = APSign
(
〈idtrans, ρ〉, skCl
)
,
Πmasked_inv = NIZK
{
rmasked_inv, idCl :
masked_inv = Mask(pre_inv, idCl, rmasked_inv)
}
.
Since masked_inv no longer needs to be hidden, this proof
is simpler than ΠCmasked_inv . As described in Figure 4, the
client sends message m1 to the provider, with m1 = (idtrans,
ρ, masked_inv, Πmasked_inv, σρ,Cl). If both the proof and
signature are valid, the provider computes the invariant inv =
Unmask(masked_inv, rpre_inv), and a signature σρ,SP with
σρ,SP =Sign
(
〈idtrans, σρ,Cl〉, skSP
)
.
Note that σρ,SP guarantees that the client chose his rating
before knowing the identifier of the provider, which guarantees
his objectivity. The provider then reveals her identifier and
the randomnesses used in nymSP, CIdSP , and pre_inv, that is
ΠSP = (rSP, r
′
SP, rIdSP , r
′
IdSP
, rpre_inv). The provider sends
message m2 to the client, with m2 = (IdSP, vkSP, certSP, inv,
ΠSP, σρ,SP). The client verifies that
nymSP = Com
(
vkSP, (rSP, r
′
SP)
)
CIdSP = Com(IdSP, (rIdSP , r
′
IdSP
))
pre_inv = Pre_inv(IdSP, rpre_inv
inv = Unmask(masked_inv, rpre_inv).
Finally, both the client and the provider are able to issue the
report by sending the elements given in the first column of Ta-
ble II to the share carriers (where the first four lines represent
the proof of transaction and the last one the rating together
with the signatures of both parties). If all the signatures and
proofs are valid, the report itself is considered valid by the
share carriers. This scenario completes successfully if both
parties are honest. If the client does not send message m1
(resp. the provider does not send message m2) then scenario B
(resp. scenario C) is run.
Client SP
m1 = (idtrans, ρ,masked_inv,Πmasked_inv, σρ,Cl)
m2 = (IdSP, vkSP, certSP, inv,ΠSP, σρ,SP)
Broadcast of the report
Figure 4. Interactions between the client and the provider to jointly issue
their report
b) Scenario B – Dishonest client/honest provider: If
the provider does not receive message m1 from the client,
she queries the share carriers for their share. On their turn,
they query the client to get his rating and, in absence of
his answer, send their shares and associated proofs to the
provider. The provider is able to reconstruct the masked
invariant as masked_inv = Interp
(
(ij , Rij )16j6tSC
)
from t
valid received shares. From that point, the service provider
computes inv = Unmask(masked_inv, rpre_inv), and issues the
report, which only contains the proof of transaction (i.e., the
elements in the second column of Table II). Figure 5 describes
this interaction.
Client SCi SP
“Nothing received for idtrans”
“What is your rating
about idtrans ?”
i, Ri,ΠRi
Broadcast of the report
timeout
Figure 5. Interactions between the provider and the share carriers to issue
the report
Table II
COMPONENTS OF THE REPORT IN THE THREE SCENARII
Scenario A (honest users) Scenario B (dishonest client) Scenario C (dishonest provider)
Service provider IdSP, vkSP, certSP, nymSP, CIdSP ,
ΠSP
IdSP, vkSP, certSP, nymSP, CIdSP ,
ΠSP
CIdSP , nymSP, PCertSP, IdSP,
(CAj )j , {ij , Qij , ΠQij
}j
Client CidCl , nymCl, PCertCl CidCl , nymCl, PCertCl CidCl , nymCl, PCertCl
Transaction identifier idtrans, σSP, σCl idtrans, σSP, σCl idtrans, σSP, σCl
Invariant pre_inv, masked_inv, inv, rpre_inv,
Πmasked_inv
pre_inv, masked_inv, inv, rpre_inv,
(CBj,k ), {ij , Rij , ΠRij
}j ,
Cmasked_inv, ΠCmasked_inv
inv, Πinv
Rating ρ, σρ,Cl, σρ,SP ρ, {σρ,SCij
}j
c) Scenario C – Dishonest provider/honest client: If
the client does not receive message m2 from the provider,
he informs the share carriers by sending them the masked
invariant and his rating together with the associated proofs and
signatures as shown in Figure 6. If the proofs and signatures
are valid, the share carriers forward them to the provider to
give her the opportunity to reveal IdSP and the invariant. In
absence of any response, the share carriers send their shares
to the client. Note that they also sign the rating of the client
to validate the fact that the client has chosen his rating before
knowing the provider’s identity. We have
σρ,SCi = Sign
(
〈idtrans, σρ,Cl〉, skSCi
)
.
Once the client has received t valid shares, he computes
IdSP = Interp
(
(ij , Qij )16j6tSC
)
, inv = Inv(IdSP, idCl), and
a proof Πinv of its computation, with
Πinv =NIZK
{
idCl : inv = IdSP
idCl
}
.
Finally, the client issues the report by sending the elements
presented on the third column of Table II to the share carriers.
Client SCi SP
m1
idtrans, nymCl, CidCl , CcertCl ,
ΠcertCl , nymSP, CIdSP , CcertSP ,
ΠcertSP , pre_inv,Πpre_inv,
masked_inv,Πmasked_inv, ρ, σρ,Cl
idtrans, ρ,masked_inv,
Πmasked_inv, σρ,Cl
(i, Qi),ΠQi , σρ,SCi
Broadcast of the report
timeout
Figure 6. Interactions between the client and the share carriers to issue the
report
Note that if neither the client nor the service provider issue
the report, then the transaction is not taken into account in the
reputation score of the service provider.
Remark 2: One may argue that both parties can collude by
jointly issuing reports as soon as the preparation is over, that
is, without having actually conducted a transaction. Similarly,
clients may choose arbitrary ratings regardless of the behavior
of providers. The only way to prevent such behaviors would be
to have an omniscient and trusted third party capable of telling
whether the transaction really occurred, or whether the effort
exerted by the provider during her transaction was bad or good
enough to deserve such a rating, which is clearly impossible.
E. Computation of the Reputation Scores
At the end of round rnd, each share carrier gathers all the
reports received since round rnd−1, and sends them to the
accredited signers. This allows the accredited signers to update
the reputation scores of all the service providers concerned
by valid reports. Once accredited signers have checked the
validity of a report, they only keep the identifier of the
provider, identifier of the transaction, the invariant inv, and
the rating of the client, if any, and sign them. Note that if two
(or more) reports have the same identifier of transaction and
invariant, they keep a single one. Beyond handling negative
ratings, the accredited signers know the rounds during which
reports have been cast. Thus, as motivated in Section II,
any reputation score function can be used, e.g. to lower the
influence of old ratings [21] or to limit the impact of ballot-
stuffing attacks [33]. In addition, the accredited signers approx-
imate the reputation score of service providers to extend their
anonymity set. Once the accredited signers have computed
the reputation score of a provider, they sign it along with the
round, rnd, and send it to the service provider:
σi = Sign
(
〈vkSP, repSP, rnd〉, skASi
)
.
Service providers can then use these signatures to prove their
reputation to their clients during round rnd+1.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We now evaluate our privacy-preserving reputation mech-
anism both in theoretical and practical ways. The former
evaluation is achieved through an analysis of the performance
of each building block, while the latter relies on its imple-
mentation on a platform made of heterogeneous computing
nodes. The number of share carriers nSC and the number of
accredited signers nAS are respectively equal to nSC = 28 and
nAS = 1. This setting is sufficient to prevent the collusions
of ⌈nSC/3⌉ − 1 = 9 share carriers with probability 2
−20 in
Table III
SIZE OF EXCHANGED MESSAGES FOR nSC = 28 AND nAS = 1, IN
KIBIBYTES
Phase Cl ↔ SP Cl ↔ SCi SP ↔ SCi report
Proof of Reputation 22 0 0 —
Sharing 3.28 2.69 2.34 —
Scenario A 2.94 0 0 12.06
Scenario B 0 0 0.75 19.63
Scenario C 0 17.94 0 20.75
a system comprising 108 service providers, including 5× 106
malicious ones, as explained in Appendix A.
A. Theoretical Study
The correctness of our mechanism relies on the verification
of NIZK proofs, which requires the computation of many
pairings. To decrease the number of these operations, we adopt
the technique proposed by Blazy et al. [8] which consists in
verifying NIZKs by batches. We also ensure efficient pairing
computations by relying on prime-order elliptic curves [5].
We consider elliptic curves in a subclass of the Barreto-
Naehrig family. Thus, elements of Zp and G1 (resp. G2) can
be represented by 32B (resp. 64B). We use the computation
costs given by Aranha et al. [5]. Namely, the four cores of
a 3.0GHz AMD Phenom II X4 940 processor – a top-level
processor of 2010 – can compute 8 pairings in a millisecond,
16 exponentiations in G2, or 48 in G1. In the following, we
study two metrics, namely (a) the size of messages exchanged
between each entity, and (b) the time necessary for each entity
to perform his computation. We now present and comment the
main results obtained with these settings. Table III gives the
size of messages (in KiB) exchanged between the different
parties involved in the reputation mechanism, namely, between
the client and the provider, the client and one share carrier,
and the provider and one share carrier before the transaction
takes place. Finally, it gives the size of the report sent to the
accredited signer once the transaction is over.
These results are both satisfactory and reassuring. The
largest messages correspond to the proof of reputation, which
comprises the mutual authentication of the service provider
and the client, and the proof by the provider of his reputa-
tion score. Nevertheless, this exchange requires only around
20KiB. This is impressive compared to the mechanism pro-
posed by Bethencourt et al. [7], where the proof of reputation
requires 500KiB per received rating. Table III also shows
that share carriers only need 3KiB when a transaction goes
well, and less than 10KiB in the worst case situation. This
clearly shows that the design of a distributed trusted third party
requires very little resources. The same comment applies for
the accredited signers. The size of the report, that comprises all
the proofs, requires no more than 20KiB in the worst case. It
is important to note that the only message that scales (linearly)
as a function of the number of the accredited signers is the
proof of reputation. Thus, even for larger sets of accredited
signers, which typically do not grow to more than 20 entities,
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Figure 7. Theoretical computation times (ms)
the communication cost remains acceptable. These results are
very reassuring because they show that, from a theoretical
point of view, privacy-preserving reputation mechanisms are
entirely viable. The next section will show that this holds in
practice!
Figure 7 details the computation cost (in ms) of each phase
of the reputation mechanism at each of the involved entities.
Several remarks are in order. The main one is that computation
times are very low. Indeed, each user needs no more than
200ms for all their computations. In particular, each share
carrier needs no more than 6ms when both the client and the
provider are honest. Even in the worst case, they need only
75ms to perform their computations. Finally, the verification
of a report requires between 45ms and 90ms. This clearly
shows that participating to one of the two distributed trusted
third parties computing entities costs little. Actually, the largest
costs are due to scenarii B or C. We can minimize those costs
by penalizing malicious users, e.g. by preventing them from
interacting for a given period of time.
B. Implementing the Reputation Mechanism
We have implemented our reputation mechanism in Python
2.7 with the Charm framework [2]. This framework facilitates
the implementation of complex cryptographic primitives, such
as Groth-Sahai’s NIZK proof system [17], and the combina-
tion of multiple primitives, e.g., to build anonymous proxy
signatures [16]. Furthermore, Charm provides the means to
benchmark applications, both by giving their running time and
by counting each elementary cryptographic operation. We also
use Twisted, an event-driven networking engine, to handle
communications between the different parties. Experiments
have been conducted on heterogeneous entities, namely, a
virtual machine running on a Dell Latitude E6430 laptop with
a 2.60 GHz Core i7-3720 QM processor, and cheap Raspberry
Pi model B machines with the Raspbian operating system.
Figure 8 presents the results of the conducted experiments.
It shows the mean and standard deviation of the computation
times of each user for every step of the interaction, namely, the
proof of reputation, the sharing, and the issuing of the report in
every scenario. Note that the “SC” columns correspond to the
computation times of one share carrier running on the virtual
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machine, and that the “AS” columns relate to the verification
of one report by an accredited signer.
Clearly, the computation times are higher than the one
obtained in theory, which can be easily explained. First,
Aranha et al. carefully select a Barreto-Naehrig curve, and
optimize the computation of pairings using Assembly and C
code [5] on this specific curve. In our case, we rely on the
MNT-159 curve proposed by Charm, which is a Python frame-
work wrapping around Lynn’s pbc library.2 Furthermore, the
theoretical number of operations per second assumes that they
are all ran in parallel, which is not the case in our experiments.
Finally, all the users except one share carrier were run on a
single virtual machine. This does not slow down the phases
where users run computations sequentially, e.g. the proof of
reputation or the construction of the report in Scenario A, but
it does slow down the concurrent ones, e.g. the sharing of the
secrets.
Even with those limitations, we observe that our mechanism
allows clients to interact with providers, and to run all the
preparation in no more than 5 s. Issuing the report may
take longer, but the most important point is that clients can
rapidly verify the reputation of a provider and get involved
in the transaction. Similarly, the pre-transaction and the post-
transaction phases respectively require no more than 5 s and
1 s which clearly allows the provider to interact with many
clients simultaneously. Note that share carriers can even be
run on cheap Raspberry Pi machines. In that case, sharing the
secrets requires no more than 4.7 s, while issuing the rating in
presence of malicious clients needs no more than 59 s. Such
cheap machines increase the waiting time of both clients and
providers, but this delay remains acceptable (less than 15 s),
compared for example to the time required to buy items on any
e-commerce web sites. Finally, running clients on Raspberry
Pi requires about 75 s for conducting the reputation proof and
115 s for the sharing. That is, clients need about 3min before
being able to conduct a transaction, which is clearly reasonable
to engage in (possibly) financial transactions.
2http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented a practical distributed
reputation mechanism addressing two main issues of reputa-
tion mechanisms: preserving all users’ privacy and computing
reputation scores based on both positive and negative ratings.
This has been achieved by combining distributed algorithms
with cryptographic schemes. Furthermore, our proposition is
independent of the reputation model, that is, our system can
integrate any reputation model [21], preferably one using both
positive and negative ratings.
As future works, we plan to study more deeply the off-
line version of the secret sharing, in particular to improve the
report verification when the service provider does not want to
collaborate. We also plan to study whether the presence of a
unique trusted entity is a necessary condition to handle both
non monotonic reputation scores and the permanent anonymity
of providers.
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APPENDIX
A. Number of Share Carriers
The share carriers are users that guarantee the undeniability
of reports. They are jointly chosen by clients and service pro-
viders for a single interaction. As explained in Section V-A1,
they are randomly chosen among all service providers. Hence,
the choice of the share carriers is equivalent to a draw without
replacement, which can be modeled by the hypergeometric
distribution. Let N be the number of potential share carriers
and m the number of malicious users. Then, the probability
of having chosen less than a third of malicious share carriers
corresponds to 1 − cdfN,m,nSC(tSC − 1), where cdfN,m,nSC
is the cumulative distribution function of the hypergeometric
distribution with parameters (N,m, nSC).
3 Therefore, if we
wish to achieve a given maximal probability of collusion pmax,
we must choose
nSC = min
{
n
∣∣∣ 1− cdfN,m,n (⌈n
3
⌉
− 1
)
< pmax
}
.
Figure 9 represents nSC for N varying between 100 and
1015, for fixed percentages m of malicious users, and for
pmax = 2
−20.
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Figure 9. Dependance of nSC in N and m (pmax = 2
−20)
As we can see, the number of required share carriers does
not grow after the number of users has reached 1,000,000.
This means that whatever the size of the system, the number
of required share carriers does not grow and our mechanism
scales. Figure 10 represents nSC for pmax varying between
2−10 and 2−70, and N = 108. As we can see, the number
of required share carriers is logarithmic in the maximal prob-
ability of collusion targeted. For instance, with nSC = 100,
we can either either prevent collusions representing 15% of
total users from obtaining a third of malicious share carriers
with probability 2−20, or prevent collusions representing 10%
of total users with probability 2−35. Since the share carriers
3We showed in Section V-B6 that tSC = ⌈nSC/3⌉.
are renewed for each transaction, it is acceptable that a report
in a million is either falsified or denied. We can thus take
pmax = 2
−20.
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Figure 10. Dependance of nSC in pmax and m (N = 10
8)
Finally, Figure 11 presents the number of required share
carriers for N = 108 and pmax = 2
−20, for varying m. As
we can see, to keep a reasonable number of share carriers,
our mechanism can tolerate up to 5% colluding users, which
requires 28 share carriers. That is, the probability that enough
share carriers are chosen among the 107 colluding ones is
lower than 2−20.
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Proportion of malicious users (N=108 , pmax=2
−20 )
100
101
102
103
104
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
re
q
u
ir
e
d
 s
h
a
re
 c
a
rr
ie
rs
Figure 11. Dependance of nSC in m (pmax = 2
−20 and N = 108)
B. Cryptographic Proofs
In this appendix, we present proofs that our reputation
mechanism guarantees the properties presented in Section III.
Note that these proofs are not the most formal. In particular,
we do not present the setups of the underlying schemes. To
prevent interferences, each cryptographic tool should be setup
independently. Furthermore, each cryptographic tool should
have different setups for each role. That is, there should be
one setup for NIZKs constructed by clients and another one
for those constructed by providers, and similarly for every
cryptographic tool.
Before presenting the formal definitions and proofs of our
properties, we must discuss the model of the adversary, that
we call A. First, we consider A to be probabilistic polynomial-
time Turing machine. We want the adversary to be able
to: (i) make two users interact; (ii) corrupt users, since the
adversary might be a collusion of users; and (iii) know which
client was involved in a transaction. Hence, we consider three
oracles that A might query during the games:
(i) Ointer that, given a client and a provider, makes them
interact;
(ii) Ocorr that, given a user, returns all this user’s credentials;
(iii) Oinv that, given an invariant, returns the client involved.
Note that the winning conditions of each game will depend
on the oracles queried by the adversary. For instance, the
adversary must not corrupt a user to compromise this user’s
privacy.
C. Privacy of Service Providers
Privacy of service providers – Property 1 – is guaranteed if
the following experiment returns 1 with probability 12+neg(λ),
where neg is a negligible function:
1) (state)← Setup(1λ)
2) (state, SP0, SP1)← A
Ointer(·),Ocorr(·),Oinv(·)(state)
3) b← {0, 1}
4) b′ ← AOinter(·),Ocorr(·),Oinv(·)(state, SPb, SPb¯)
5) Return 1 if b′ = b; 0 otherwise.
In Step 2 of this game, A can make any two users interact.
A can also corrupt any users, but strictly less than a majority
of nAS accredited signers. Service providers SP0 and SP1
are service providers of equivalent reputation that were not
corrupted by A. In Step 4, A cannot corrupt SP0, SP1, SPb,
SPb¯ or more than tSC share carriers involved in one of SPb’s
or SPb¯’s interactions. A also cannot make SPb or SPb¯ interact
with a client and go beyond the report; thus, there is no
invariant computed by SPb or SPb¯, and SPb and SPb¯ have
not revealed their identity to any client.
Proof: The only way for A to obtain information re-
garding b is to have clients interact with SPb. However,
A does not see neither the invariant nor the identity of
SPb. Furthermore, making SPb interact simultaneously with
many different clients does not give more information to A
than just one interaction: all the elements shown by SPb
are randomized. Therefore, we consider a single interaction
between SPb and a client chosen by A, and we assume that
the last phase of the transaction has not started yet.
During this interaction, A sees nymSPb , CIdSPb , repSPb ,
pre_invb, {vkASik }16k6tAS , CcertSPb , ΠcertSPb , Πrepb ,
Πpre_inv,b, sSC,b, σSP,b, {CAj,b}16j6tSC−1, {Qi,b,Πc,i,b}i∈I ,
where I is a set of cardinal lower than tSC. Since A has
corrupted less than tSC share carriers, the Qi,b give no
information about IdSPb and can be considered as random
elements.
Among those elements, sSC,b and the Qi,b are random ele-
ments, hence they give no information about the service pro-
vider. Using the hiding property of commitments and NIZKs,
new games can be defined, in which all commitments and
NIZKs – hence anonymous proxy signatures – are replaced by
random elements. The indistinguishability of these games with
the original ones is related to the security assumption of the
commitment and NIZK schemes. The only element that might
leak information is pre_invb, that is (G1
r, IdSPb Y1
r), where
r is randomly chosen by SPb. From the DDH assumption
in G1 on the tuple (G1, G1
r, Y1 = G1
α1), it follows that
Y1
r is indistinguishable from a random element R ∈ G1. By
taking R′ = IdSP1
−1 · IdSP0 ·R, we have IdSP0 ·R = IdSP1 ·R
′,
where R′ is also indistinguishable from Y r2 . Thus, IdSP0 ·Y1
r
is indistinguishable from IdSP1 ·Y1
r, and the advantage of the
adversary in this game is lower than two times the DDH
advantage.
The same reasoning can be applied to SPb¯.
D. Privacy of Clients
Privacy of clients (Property 2) relies on two parts. First,
during a transaction, the provider does not know whom they
are interacting with. Secondly, the transactions between a
client and different service providers are unlinkable. The
following two experiments capture these notions. This property
is guaranteed if both return 1 with probability 12 + neg(λ).
1) (state)← Setup(1λ)
2) (state,Cl0,Cl1, {SPi}16i6n) ←
AOinter(·),Ocorr(·),Oinv(·)(state)
3) b← {0, 1}
4) b′ ← AOinter(·),Ocorr(·),Oinv(·)(state,Clb,Clb¯, {SPi}16i6n)
5) Return 1 if b′ = b; 0 otherwise.
In Step 2 of this experiment, Cl0 and Cl1 are clients who
have not been corrupted by A. In Step 4, A cannot corrupt
Cl0, Cl1, Clb, or Clb¯. Furthermore, the set of service providers
having interacted (and gone beyond the transaction) with Cl0
or Cl1 is disjoint from the set of providers having interacted
(and gone beyond the transaction) with Clb or Clb¯. That is,
no service provider has interacted with (Cl0 or Cl1) and (Clb
or Clb¯).
Proof: The proof of this property contains two parts.
Firstly, can the adversary obtain any information about b with-
out having the clients go beyond the transaction? Secondly, can
the adversary link the clients of different providers?
Similarly to the previous proof, if the clients do not go
beyond the transaction, A sees only commitments, NIZK
proofs, anonymous proxy signatures, and randomnesses. As
explained previously, these elements give no information about
b or b¯.
After the transaction, the only different elements are the
masked invariants, and the invariants:
masked_inv = (G1
sY1
idCl , IdSP
idClG1
rsY1
r idCl)
inv0 = IdSP
idCl
Note that since the provider proves the computation of pre_inv,
an honest client will not compute anything more than this
masked invariant. Furthermore, we remark that the masked
invariant is based on the invariant, and G1
sY1
idCl . Since
s is chosen randomly by the client, this last element is
indistinguishable from a random element, and only the final
invariant is useful to A.
Now, the adversary A only has access to the invariants
involving Cl0, Cl1, Clb, or Clb¯ with the SPi, with the
restriction that a given service provider cannot produce an
invariant with (Cl0 or Cl1) and (Clb or Clb¯). Thus, we consider
a hybrid sequence composed of k service providers involved
only with Cl0 and Cl1, and n − k other providers involved
only with Clb and Clb¯:
Game G0:
(
Inv(SPi,Clb), Inv(SPi,Clb¯)
)
, 1 6 i 6 n
Game G1:
(
Inv(SPi,Cl0), Inv(SPi,Cl1)
)
, 1 6 i 6 n
Game G˜1k
{(
Inv(SPi,Cl0), Inv(SPi,Cl1)
)
1 6 i 6 k(
Inv(SPi,Clb), Inv(SPi,Clb¯)
)
k < i 6 n,
Game G˜2k

(
Inv(SPi,Cl0), Inv(SPi,Cl1)
)
1 6 i < k(
R← G1, Inv(SPi,Clb¯)
)
i = k(
Inv(SPi,Clb), Inv(SPi,Clb¯)
)
k < i 6 n,
Game G˜3k

(
Inv(SPi,Cl0), Inv(SPi,Cl1)
)
1 6 i < k(
R← G1, R
′ ← G1
)
i = k(
Inv(SPi,Clb), Inv(SPi,Clb¯)
)
k < i 6 n,
Game G˜4k

(
Inv(SPi,Cl0), Inv(SPi,Cl1)
)
1 6 i < k(
Inv(SPi,Cl0), R
′ ← G1
)
i = k(
Inv(SPi,Clb), Inv(SPi,Clb¯)
)
k < i 6 n,
for 1 6 k 6 n, where R and R′ are taken uniformly at random.
Note that G0 and G˜
1
0 are the same, as well as G1 and G˜
1
n. We
prove that for k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, G˜ik and G˜
i+1
k
are indistinguishable, as well as G˜4k and G˜
1
k+1. Hence, games
G0 and G1 are indistinguishable.
First, let us prove that games G˜1k and G˜
2
k are indistin-
guishable. The only difference between those two two games
concerns SPk: the adversary has access to either inv(SPk,Cl0)
or to a random element R.
Let us consider a DDH tuple (A = Ga, B = Gb, Z). We
fix IdSPk = B and idCl0 = a. If the adversary A is able
to distinguish these two games, A is also able to distinguish
Gab from a random element R. That is, the adversary can tell
whether Z is Gab or a random element, knowing only G, Ga,
and Gb.
Hence, G˜1k and G˜
2
k are indistinguishable for A. With the
same reasoning, we can show that all the successive games
are indistinguishable for A. Therefore, the advantage of the
adversary in this hybrid sequence is lower than 4n times the
DDH advantage, and games G0 and G1 are indistinguishable.
E. Undeniability of Reports
The undeniability of ratings (see Property 3), captures the
notion that a service provider cannot prevent a client from
rating her, and that the client’s rating will be taken into account
in the provider reputation score. Property 3 is guaranteed if
the following game returns 1 with probability neg(λ):
1) (state)← Setup(1λ)
2) (Cl0)← A
Ointer(·),Ocorr(·),Oinv(·)(state)
3) A makes Cl0 interact with SP0, and Cl0 issues a report
rpt0
4) Return 1 if Cl0 has not been corrupted by A, and either
rpt0 is not valid or rpt0 was not issued on SP0
Proof: A game-based approach can formally prove the
undeniability of reports, however we only give hints for such
a proof. First, we consider the elements received by the client
before the transaction. Under the robustness of the signature
scheme, and the binding property of the commitment scheme
and NIZK proof system, the adversary is not able to imper-
sonate an uncorrupted service provider. Thus, the adversary
necessarily uses the credentials of one of the corrupted pro-
viders, and must share this provider’s identity with the share
carriers. After the transaction, when the adversary completes
the protocol, the binding property once more guarantees that
the revealed identity is the one used before the transaction,
which correspond to one of the corrupted service providers.
In the other case, the adversary cannot prevent the client from
obtaining the share carriers’ shares, and then reconstructing the
secret. In both cases, the client can construct a valid report.
Similar experiment and reasoning can be used to prove
Property 4.
F. Unforgeability of Reports
An adversary has two options to forge a report. First, by
forging signatures from a majority of the accredited signers.
By assumption, less than nAS2 accredited signers are malicious,
thus such a case is not possible. Secondly, the adversary
may forge a valid report. The unforgeability of reports –
Property 5 – is guaranteed if the following experiment returns
1 with probability neg(λ):
1) (state)← Setup(1λ)
2) rpt0 ← A
Ointer(·),Ocorr(·),Oinv(·)(state)
3) Return 1 if
a) rpt0 is valid
b) vkCl0 = Open(nymCl,0)
c) either Cl0 or SP0 has not been corrupted by A
d) rpt0 is different from any other report between Cl0
and SP0
where rpt0 is a report issued by nymCl,0 on provider SP0.
Proof: The report rpt0 consists of the following four
elements:
• the identity of the service provider, represented by IdSP0
and vkSP0 , and their pseudonym for the transaction, that
is CIdSP0 and nymSP0 ;
• the pseudonym of the client, nymCl0 and CidCl0 ;
• the identifier of the transaction, idtrans,0;
• the invariant, inv0
And, if the client is correct, the report also comprises their
rating ρ0. Each of these elements is either signed by both
the client and the provider – like idtrans0 – or proven thanks
to proofs that may be non-interactive and zero-knowledge, or
not – like inv0. We show that to change any of these elements,
A must break one of the underlying primitives.
a) Changing the identity of the service provider: Sup-
pose that A has modified IdSP, vkSP and certSP. Thus,
either A has forged ΠSP, or modified nymSP0 and CIdSP0 ,
and computed a correct proof ΠSP. The security of NIZKs
prevents A from doing the former. Furthermore, σSP and
σCl are two signatures from both the provider and the client
on idtrans0 = sSC‖rSC‖ nymCl ‖ nymSP. The security of the
anonymous proxy signatures hence prevents A from forging
such signatures. If the service provider did not participate in
the report emission, the client proves the reconstruction of
IdSP0 thanks to the shares of the share carriers. Each of these
shares is signed by the service provider, which prevents A
from forging them. Therefore, A cannot modify the provider’s
identity. The same reasoning shows that A cannot modify the
identity of the client or the identifier of the transaction either.
b) Changing the invariant: If the service provider did
not participate in the report emission, changing the invariant
comes down to modifying IdSP0 or idCl0 – which is hard, as
shown previously – or forging Πinv0 , which is hard as well.
If the service provider did participate, inv0 depends directly
from masked_inv0. Modifying inv0 thus means modifying
masked_inv0. masked_inv0 is computed from pre_inv0, which
depends directly on IdSP0 . As shown previously, IdSP0 cannot
be modified. Thus, to modify masked_inv0, A must forge
Πmasked_inv0 , which is hard. Therefore, A cannot modify the
invariant.
c) Changing the rating: To modify the rating, A must
either forge signatures σd,Cl0 and σd,SP0 if both the client
and the provider are correct, or forge t signatures from the
share carriers. Since A cannot corrupt both Cl0 and SP0, the
security of the anonymous proxy signature scheme prevents
them to do so.
Since the adversary must break the NIZK proofs or the
anonymous proxy signatures to win this game, their advantage
is negligible and the unforgeability of reports is guaranteed.
G. Linkability of Reports
The linkability of reports (Property 6) is guaranteed if the
following experiment returns 1 with probability neg(λ):
1) (state)← Setup(1λ)
2) (rpt0, rpt1)← A
Ointer(·),Ocorr(·),Oinv(·)(state)
3) Return 1 if:
a) rpt0, rpt1 are valid, and
b) rpt0 and rpt1 concern the same provider, and
c) Open(nymCl,0) = Open(nymCl,1) and inv0 6= inv1,
or
d) Open(nymCl,0) 6= Open(nymCl,1) and inv0 = inv1
Proof: We previously proved that reports are unforge-
able. Thus, if rpt0 (resp. rpt1) is valid, rpt0 contains
inv0 = IdSP0
idCl0 (resp. inv1 = IdSP0
idCl1 ), where Cl0 =
Open(nymCl,0) (resp. Cl1 = Open(nymCl,1)). Therefore,
inv0 = inv1 if and only if Cl0 = Cl1, and reports are linkable.
H. Representativeness of Reputation Scores
The representativeness of reputation scores (Property 7),
captures the notion that an adversary cannot prove another
reputation than their own one. This property is guaranteed if
the following game returns 1 with probability neg(λ):
1) (state)← Setup(1λ)
2) (nymSP,0, CIdSP,0 , repSP,0, CcertSP,0 ,ΠcertSP,0 ,Πrep,0)
← AOinter(·),Ocorr(·),Oinv(·)(state)
3) Return 1 if:
a) ΠcertSP,0 and Πrep,0 are valid for nymSP,0, CIdSP,0 ,
CcertSP,0 and repSP,0, and
b) SP′0 = Open(nymSP,0) and repSP′
0
6= repSP,0
Proof: As proven previously, reports cannot be forged,
and thus the reports signed by the accredited signers are
legitimate reports. Hence, honest accredited signers compute
and sign a representative reputation score. Since we made
the assumption that less than nAS/2 accredited signers are
malicious, a service provider cannot receive enough signatures
from accredited signers to prove a different reputation score.
Furthermore, the security of NIZKs and anonymous proxy
signatures prevent A from forging valid proofs of reputation.
Therefore, the representativeness of reputation scores holds.
